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FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND THE
CONSEQUENCES OF A SUCCESSFUL
INSANITY DEFENSE
"I did not want a mad dog released."
- Anonymous Juror'
INTRODUCTION
The insanity defense has a peculiar resonance in the minds of most
Americans. There is something oddly counterintuitive about it. A per-
son commits a terrible crime, yet the courts say he is not to blame-
they tell us that he is not guilty. The clear stamp of guilt or innocence
that we expect from the courts is missing, and we are left with the
sneaking suspicion that someone has just gotten away with murder.
This uneasiness is reinforced by our uncertainty about what hap-
pens after the verdict. Although most people know that guilty defend-
ants go to jail and innocent defendants are set free, fewer people know
what happens to the defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Is the person committed? If so, for how long? Is there a chance that
she will be released? The possibility that criminally insane defendants
may be walking the streets causes understandable concern.
In a criminal trial in which the defendant puts on an insanity de-
fense, this concern is especially relevant for the jurors who must decide
the case. Studies show that jurors, despite being admonished other-
wise, sometimes consider the consequences of their verdicts when de-
liberating.2 What effect might uncertainty about the consequences of
an insanity verdict have on their decisionmaking processes? Does this
uncertainty hurt the defendant? Would eliminating this uncertainty by
instructing the jury give rise to additional problems?
Vigorous debate exists among the state courts about the propriety
of instructing jurors about the consequences of a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity (NGI).3 Some state courts require judges to give
an instruction, on the theory that most jurors do not know what hap-
1. Response to a survey sent out to jurors who had participated in trials in which an
insanity defense was raised. Grant H. Morris et al., Whither Thou Goest? An Inquiry
Into Jurors' Perceptions of the Consequences of a Successful Insanity Defense, 14 San
Diego L. Rev. 1058, 1074 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Henry Weihofen, Procedure for Determining Defendant's Mental
Condition Under the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 29 Temp. L.Q. 235,
247 (1956) (commenting on preliminary results from the definitive study of juror
behavior conducted at the University of Chicago by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel,
eventually published as Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (1966)).
3. See Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Instructions in State Criminal Case in
Which Defendant Pleads Insanity as to Hospital Confinement in Event of Acquittal, 81
A.L.R. 4th 659, 664-75 (1991); see also Jennifer Fletcher, Comment, The Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity Verdict: ShouldJuries be Informed of its Consequences?, 72 Ky. LJ.
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pens to the defendant after such a verdict, and that giving the instruc-
tion therefore prevents juror confusion.4 Others explicitly forbid
judges to give the instruction, maintaining that information about the
consequences of their verdicts distracts jurors from their proper func-
tion as the finders of fact.5 Still others hold that the instruction should
be given only under particular circumstances. 6
This Note explores the debate in the federal context. Prior to
1984, almost all federal circuit courts agreed that trial judges should
not instruct jurors as to the consequences of an acquittal based on in-
sanity. The enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform Act (the "Act")
in 1984, 7 however, has led several circuit courts to reexamine this issue.
The resulting opinions set forth three different approaches-one ap-
proach states that the instruction should not be given, another states
that it should be given, and a third states that the issue should be left to
the discretion of the trial judge.
This Note argues that trial judges should instruct jurors about the
consequences of an insanity verdict, but that judges must strive to mini-
mize the potentially prejudicial impact of such an instruction by explic-
itly instructing the jury not to consider this information in arriving at a
verdict. Part I takes a brief historical look at the role of the jury, charts
the general proscription against instructing jurors about the conse-
quences of their verdicts, and explores the application of this proscrip-
tion to the insanity defense prior to enactment of the Insanity Defense
Reform Act. Part II considers the most significant changes the Act
made in the federal insanity defense and examines the various ap-
proaches the circuit courts have taken on the issue of jury instruction
since passage of the Act. Finally, Part III takes a critical look at the
approaches to this issue adopted by the circuit courts, examines their
conflicting rationales in light of the substantive changes made by the
Insanity Defense Reform Act, and proposes an alternative approach
that takes into account both these changes and the justifications that
supported the traditional ban against instructing jurors about the con-
sequences of their verdicts.
207, 211-17 (1983) (discussing state law treatment of this issue). A thorough analysis of
the debate in the state courts is beyond the scope of this Note.
4. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 166 Cal. App. 3d 540, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985);
People v. Thomson, 591 P.2d 1031, 1031-32 (Colo. 1979); Roberts v. State, 335 So. 2d
285, 287-88 (Fla. 1976).
5. See, e.g., Madison v. State, 697 S.W.2d 106, 107-08 (Ark. 1985); Hand v. State,
354 A.2d 140, 141 (Del. 1976); People v. Meeker, 407 N.E.2d 1058, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980).
6. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bannister, 443 N.E.2d 1325, 1332 (Mass. App. Ct.
1983) (instruction not required when defendant fails to request it); State v. Huiett, 246
S.E.2d 862, 864 (S.C. 1978) (instruction required when jury given inaccurate view of the
law as to disposition of defendant acquitted on insanity).
7. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (1988)).
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I. THE ROLE OF THE JURY AND THE STATE OF THE LAW PRIOR TO THE
INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM ACT
An examination of the traditional role and function of the jury is
critical to an understanding of the issues presented by the insanity in-
struction. The role of the jury has evolved such that juries decide is-
sues of fact while judges decide issues of law. In order to preserve the
jury's fact-finding role, courts today generally refrain from instructing
jurors about the consequences of their verdicts. Prior to the passage of
the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, almost all federal circuits ap-
plied this policy to cases in which the defendant put forth an insanity
defense.
A. The History and Significance of the Jury's Role as Finder of Fact
Trial by jury first appeared in England shortly after the Norman
Conquest.8 It developed as an alternative to then-existing methods of
dispute resolution-trial by combat, trial by ordeal, and trial by wager
of law. Gradually, as the limitations of these other means of resolving
disputes became evident, trial by jury became increasingly popular,
eventually replacing these methods altogether. 9
The jury of that period bore only a vague resemblance to its mod-
em counterpart. Originally, the jury consisted of a group of citizens
chosen from the community in which the dispute arose. The judge or
officer of the king would summon twelve such individuals to testify as to
the facts or the parties involved in the dispute. 10 Thejudge would sub-
sequently settle the dispute based on information provided by the ju-
rors. These jurors thus served more like modern-day trial witnesses
than modern-day jurors.
Gradually, however, the role of the jury changed. Judges began to
ask jurors not only to supply the facts, but also to decide whether the
facts warranted a given verdict, that is, whether the defendant was
guilty or not guilty. Moreover, courts began informally to call wit-
nesses, in addition to those who served on the jury, to testify as to the
facts of the case. As this practice increased and became more formal-
ized, jurors relied less and less on personal knowledge and more on
evidence brought before them. I ' The role of the jury thus gradually
evolved into one of evaluating the evidence presented before it, find-
ing the facts, and applying the law to these facts.' 2 It was largely in this
form that trial by jury was brought to America by the colonists.
While juries were responsible for deciding issues of fact, judges
8. See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Judging the Jury 25 (1986).
9. See id. at 25-27.
10. See id. at 26; Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions,
Qualifications and Selection 51 (1956).
11. See Hans & Vidmar, supra note 8, at 27.
12. See Vanderbilt, supra note 10, at 52.
1993] 1225
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
were responsible for deciding issues of law.' 3 The rationale for this
separation of functions rested on the different competences of the
judge and jury. Judges, with their superior understanding of the law,
were best able to decide the complex and sometimes technical issues
raised by the law. Juries, on the other hand, were better equipped to
make judgments about everyday facts. By drawing from the varied ex-
periences of individuals within the group, the jury could best determine
what had actually occurred in the case before it.1 4 The Supreme Court
recognized the jury's particular expertise as finder of fact in Railroad Co.
v. Stout:15
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men
of education and men of little education, men of learning and
men whose learning consists only in what they have them-
selves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the
farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their sep-
arate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and
draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus
given it is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed
that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than
does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions
from admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.' 6
Modem trials continue to maintain this separation of functions between
the judge and jury.' 7
13. See, e.g., M. Hale, 2 Pleas of the Crown 312, 313 (1676) ("of such matter[s] of
fact juries] were the only competent judges .... [I]f the judge's opinion must rule the
matter of fact, the trial, byjury would be useless."), quoted in Sparfv. United States, 156
U.S. 51, 118-19 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting).
14. The jury also serves several non-fact-finding functions. One of the primary
purposes of trial by jury in a criminal case is to shield the individual from the coercive
and potentially arbitrary power of the state. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
(1968) (finding that the "right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to
prevent oppression by the Government") (citations omitted). Trial by jury interposes
between the government and the individual the common sense and judgment of a group
of citizens. It checks the power of the state in a particularly democratic manner. Trial
by jury also protects the defendant against the possible prejudices of the judge. See
Alfredo Garcia, The Sixth Amendment in Modem American Jurisprudence 185 (1992).
In a group of citizens, individuals' prejudices are, in theory, balanced against the views
of others, thus tending to soften radical views and to result in decisions that are
consistent with the views of the general community. Finally, trial by jury serves an
additional function of "promot[ing] community participation in the determination of
guilt or innocence." Id. (citations omitted).
15. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
16. Id. at 664.
17. Although this separation of functions was originally brought to America along
with the idea of trial by jury, juries were given the power to decide issues of law as well
as issues of fact for a brief period after adoption of the Constitution. This may have
reflected both the high esteem with which juries were regarded at that time and the lack
of a sufficient number ofjudges adequately versed in the law. In Georgia v. Brailsford, 3
U.S. (3 Dal.) 1 (1794), for example, a case under the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, ChiefJustice Jay stated to the jury that, while the Court's opinion as to
1226 [Vol. 93:1223
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B. The General Rule Against Informing Jurors of the Consequences of Their
Verdicts
In keeping with the view that juries decide issues of fact and judges
decide issues of law, courts in criminal cases have long held it inappro-
priate for the jury to be informed of the consequences of its verdicts. 18
In fact, judges often explicitly instruct jurors not to consider issues of
sentencing or punishment. Standard jury instructions often incorpo-
rate a provision similar to the following:
The punishment provided by law for the offense charged in
the indictment is a matter exclusively within the province of
the Court and should never be considered by the jury in any
way in arriving at an impartial verdict as to the offense
charged.19
In issuing this proscription, the court seeks to maintain the traditional
separation between the roles of judge and jury in criminal cases. Is-
sues of sentencing or subsequent treatment of the defendant are gener-
ally considered issues of law and, absent a contrary statutory provision,
remain the exclusive province of the judge.20 Since the jury only de-
the law was unanimous, the jury was free to determine the law without regard to the
Court's opinion. See id. at 4.
As the level of enthusiasm for trial by jury waned, however, and criticism of jury
performance began to arise, the courts sharply curtailed the jury's power to decide
issues of law. Moreover, the number of trained judges increased, reducing the need to
rely on the common sense ofjurors in deciding the law. The courts during this period
developed a series of procedural devices (e.g., special verdicts, directed verdicts, jury
interrogatories) which enabled the judge to limit the jury's role. See Hans & Vidmar,
supra note 8, at 39. Eventually, the Supreme Court eliminated the jury's power to
decide issues of law altogether, holding that juries were limited to deciding issues of
fact. See Spar , 156 U.S. at 51, 63-64, 101-03.
More recent debate about the proper role of the jury has centered around whether
juries indeed function as only fact-finders, or whether trial by jury serves other, non-fact-
finding goals. See, e.g., Mirjan R. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority
119 (1986); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357, 1363-66 (1985).
18. See Miller v. United States, 37 App. D.C. 138, 143 (1911); see also United
States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1384-85 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. McCracken,
488 F.2d 406, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Davidson, 367 F.2d 60, 63 (6th
Cir. 1966); Pope v. United States, 298 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir. 1962).
19. 1 EdwardJ. Devitt et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 20.01, at 822
(4th ed. 1992); see also id. at 825, 827-28, 832 (Fifth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Eleventh
Circuit pattern jury instructions).
20. See Pope, 298 F.2d at 508.
Generally speaking, jurors decide the facts in accordance with the rules of law
as stated in the instructions of the court. Unless otherwise provided by statute,
it is the duty of the court to impose sentence, or make such other disposition of
the case as required by law, after the facts have been decided by the jury.
Id.; see also Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975) (judge's response to a
question from the jury "should have included the admonition that the jury had no
sentencing function and should reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might
be imposed").
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cides issues of fact, any information about sentencing is irrelevant and
can only distract the jury from its designated function.
In addition, the courts have expressed the particular fear that in-
formation concerning the potential consequences of a verdict will invite
the jury to issue verdicts tainted by compromise. 21 For example, when
a jury believes a defendant is guilty of a particular crime, knows the
sentence for that crime, and considers the punishment to be too harsh,
the jury may find the defendant not guilty. Such a result would corrupt
the jury's fact-finding role.22 Moreover, the jury would be substituting
its own judgment about the severity of the crime for that of the legisla-
ture. Refusing to instruct the jury about the consequences of its ver-
dicts thus preserves the jury's ability to perform its proper function.
C. Application of the General Rule to Acquittals Based on Insanity
Prior to the enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,
almost all federal jurisdictions followed this policy of refusing to in-
struct juries about the consequences of their verdicts in cases in which
the defendant presented an insanity defense. 23 In addition to preserv-
ing the separation between the functions of the judge and jury, this
policy protected the defendant from a specific type of juror prejudice
that could arise from the federal insanity law then in force. Before
1984, federal law did not recognize a verdict of "not guilty by reason of
insanity" distinct from the verdict of "not guilty." A criminal defend-
ant who successfully presented an insanity defense was simply found
not guilty. Subsequent treatment of the defendant depended on sepa-
rate state civil commitment procedures. Indeed, there was no guaran-
tee that the defendant would be institutionalized at all as a result of
these state proceedings. To mount a successful insanity defense, the
defendant was required only to demonstrate a reasonable doubt of her
legal sanity;24 affirmative proof of insanity was not required. Thus, an
21. See, e.g., Pope, 298 F.2d at 508 (To inform jury about consequences of verdict
will "tend to draw the attention of the jury away from their chief function as sole judges
of the facts, open the door to compromise verdicts and to confuse the issue or issues to
be decided.").
22. An analogous situation arises when a judge's comments about the subsequent
disposition of the defendant serves to "unlock" a deadlocked jury. Several federal
courts have held that a judge commits reversible error when she informs a jury that it
can recommend leniency when it issues a verdict, and it is clear that the belief that the
judge would give a lenient sentence "unlocked" the jury. See, e.g., Rogers, 422 U.S. at
40-41; Davidson, 367 F.2d at 63.
23. See United States v. Portis, 542 F.2d 414, 420-21 (7th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1047-48 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. McCracken, 488
F.2d 406, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Borum, 464 F.2d 896, 900-01 (10th
Cir. 1972); Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534, 546-47 (9th Cir. 1966).
24. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484 (1895); see also Henry T. Miller,
Comment, Recent Changes in Criminal Law: The Federal Insanity Defense, 46 La. L.
Rev. 337, 353-54 (1985) (discussing federal law prior to passage of the Insanity Defense
Reform Act).
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acquittal based on insanity did not automatically result in civil commit-
ment. The possibility existed that a defendant could be acquitted, yet
elude state commitment and be released.
Accordingly, the proscription against informing juries of the con-
sequences of a successful insanity defense worked in the defendant's
favor. It barred prosecutors from suggesting that the defendant would
not face incarceration if found not guilty by reason of insanity.25
Otherwise, by playing on the jury's understandable concern that such a
person would be released into society, the prosecution could try to in-
fluence the jury to find the defendant guilty, even when the jury be-
lieved that the defendant was legally insane. In refusing to give jurors
the instruction, courts protected the defendant against this particular
form of prejudice.
Given the state of the law at the time, this refusal to give the in-
struction was entirely appropriate. Although some jurors might not
have clearly understood the consequences of an acquittal based on in-
sanity, the potential prejudice from such uncertainty was less than the
potential prejudice from actual knowledge of the consequences. In the
absence of the instruction, jurors would, at worst, correctly assume that
the defendant would be released upon an acquittal based on insanity; at
best, the jurors would refrain entirely from considering the implica-
tions of their judgment. Giving the instruction, however, would pro-
vide no clear benefit, and would serve only to focus the jury's attention
on the consequences of the verdict, thereby inviting a compromise.
D. An Exception to the General Rule
In the face of the majority of federal courts' refusal to instruct ju-
ries of the consequences of a successful insanity defense, the D.C.
Circuit alone expressly adopted a different approach to this issue. In
Lyles v. United States,2 6 the D.C. Circuit held that it was proper to in-
struct juries about the consequences of a successful insanity defense.2 7
Although acknowledging the traditional proscription against informing
the jury of the consequences of its verdict, the court based its contrary
approach on the difference between the D.C. and other federal circuits
in their treatment of the insanity defense.
Unlike other federal jurisdictions, the law of the District of
Columbia allowed for a separate verdict of "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity" (NGI).28 Also unlike other jurisdictions, such a verdict trig-
25. See, e.g., Evalt, 359 F.2d at 534, in which the court found error where the
prosecutor stated in his closing argument, "If you find him not guilty, he walks out of
this courtroom a free man, and I know, ladies and gentlemen, that you are not going to
turn this man loose again on society." Id. at 545.
26. 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958).
27. See id. at 728.
28. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301 (1951 & Supp. V) (current version at D.C. Code Ann.
§ 24-301 (1981)).
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gered automatic commitment of the defendant. 29 A defendant thus
could not avoid commitment after being found NGI. This eliminated
the concern that giving jurors the instruction would unduly influence
them to convict, since they would be informed that the defendant, if
found not guilty by reason of insanity, would be committed to a mental
hospital.3 0
The court also pointed out that, while one could assume that most
jurors commonly understood the consequences of guilty and not-guilty
verdicts, no such assumption could be made about the verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity. In order to avoid confusion among the
three verdicts, the court found that the jury had "a right to know the
meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it knows by common
knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts."''a
The Lyles court's explanation of the grounds for its decision is puz-
zling. First, the court curiously phrases its decision in terms of the
rights of the juror, rather than the rights of the defendant. There is
surprisingly little discussion of the potential prejudice to the defendant
that may be caused by failing to give the instruction.32 Moreover,
although the court establishes that a juror has a "right" to know what
an NGI verdict means as accurately as she knows what the other ver-
dicts mean, it never explains the source of this right. Perhaps the court
believes a basic level of knowledge about the consequences of verdicts
is necessary for ajury to understand what it is deciding. That is, ajury
should at the very least know that guilty defendants go to jail, innocent
defendants are set free, and defendants found NGI are committed. Yet
this reasoning runs against the justification for the traditional bar
against informing the jury of the consequences of its verdicts. If the
proper function of the jury is solely the finding of facts, then any infor-
mation about the consequences of its verdict, no matter how basic, is
essentially irrelevant. Accordingly, informing jurors of the conse-
quences of an NGI verdict would simply add more irrelevant knowl-
29. See id.
30. Indeed, at the trial, the court gave the jury the following instruction:
If a defendant is found not guilty on the ground of insanity, it then becomes the
duty of the Court to commit him to St. Elizabeths Hospital, and this the Court
would do. The defendant then would remain at St. Elizabeths Hospital until he
is cured and it is deemed safe to release him; and when that time arrives he will
be released and will suffer no further consequences from this offense.
Lyles, 254 F.2d at 728.
31. Id. The position taken by the Lyles court was by no means new. As early as
1800, English courts recognized an exception to the general proscription against
informing juries about the consequences of their verdicts when the law required that
defendants acquitted on the grounds of insanity be committed. See United States v.
Blume, 967 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1992) (Newman, J., concurring in the result) (citing
Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281, 1354-56 (1800)). Since the Lyles decision, courts
of several states with mandatory commitment statutes have adopted the same approach.
See Fleming, supra note 3, at 675-79.
32. See Lyles, 254 F.2d at 728-29.
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edge to what jurors already know about the other verdicts. The Lyles
court's justification of its departure from the approach adopted by the
other circuits is, in the end, unsatisfying.
II. THE DEBATE SINCE PASSAGE OF THE INSANITY
DEFENSE REFORM ACT
Changes in the federal law's substantive treatment of the insanity
defense have led some circuit courts to reexamine the issue of inform-
ing juries about the consequences of a successful insanity defense.
Although the changes made by the Insanity Defense Reform Act did
not expressly address the issue ofjury instructions, they did alter some
of the rationales behind earlier decisions that refused to give the in-
struction. The circuit courts that have considered this issue since pas-
sage of the Act have adopted substantially different approaches. These
differences are based primarily on disagreements as to which policies
the original proscription against such jury instructions was intended to
further.
A. Changes in the Substantive Federal Insanity Law
Prior to 1984, there existed no uniform federal definition of crimi-
nal insanity.3 3 In the absence of a definitive declaration from either
Congress or the Supreme Court, federal circuits enjoyed wide discre-
tion in defining what constituted criminal insanity. Many circuits even-
tually adopted the definition set forth in the ALI Model Penal Code,
3 4
under which a defendant was not held criminally responsible if he
lacked "substantial capacity" either (1) to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct (the "cognitive" test) or (2) to conform his conduct to the
requirement of law (the "volitional" test).35 Once the defendant raised
the insanity defense, the government bore the burden of proving the
defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt.3 6 Furthermore, as noted
33. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 233 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3405; Miller, supra note 24, at 349.
34. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 223-24 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3405-06; Miller, supra note 24, at 345; see also United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 979-81 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (surveying the various approaches
adopted by the different circuits).
Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) reads:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct.
35. See id.
36. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484 (1895); see also supra text
accompanying note 24.
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above,3 7 federal law, with the exception of the law of the District of
Columbia, did not explicitly provide for commitment of defendants ac-
quitted on grounds of insanity.3 8
On the heels of the John Hinckley trial,3 9 Congress enacted the
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 198440 in response to perceived fail-
ings in the federal treatment of the insanity defense. The facts of the
Hinckley case should be generally familiar. On March 30, 1981, John
Hinckley, Jr. fired several shots at then-President Ronald Reagan as
Reagan left a hotel in Washington, D.C. Hinckley wounded the Presi-
dent and several others who were nearby. At his trial, Hinckley success-
fully presented an insanity defense and was acquitted of all thirteen
charges brought against him.41
Although legal scholars had criticized the ALI definition of insanity
prior to the Hinckley trial,42 Hinckley's acquittal triggered widespread
public outrage about the status of the insanity defense.43 This, in turn,
prompted Congress to undertake a careful reexamination of the federal
law.44 The legislative history suggests that Congress wanted primarily
to address four issues: (1) the definition of criminal insanity; (2) the
burden of proof; (3) the use of expert testimony; and (4) the subse-
quent treatment of defendants deemed insane.45
In several respects, the Act marked a sharp departure from prior
approaches to the insanity defense. First, the reform measure nar-
rowed the definition of criminal insanity.4 6 The new definition differs
37. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
38. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 241 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3423.
39. See United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d
115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
40. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247 (1988)).
41. See Laura A. Kiernan & Eric Pianin, Hinckley Found Not Guilty, Insane: Will
Be Committed to St. Elizabeths, Wash. Post, June 22, 1982, at Al; Stuart Taylor, Jr.,
Hinckley Cleared But is Held Insane in Reagan Attack, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1982, at
Al.
42. See, e.g., Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 77-78 (9th Cir. 1970) (TraskJ.,
dissenting); Donald HJ. Hermann, The Insanity Defense: Philosophical, Historical, and
Legal Perspectives 142 (1983); Jerome Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65
Yale LJ. 761, 777 (1956).
43. See Hans & Vidmar, supra note 8, at 181-82; Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater,
John Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: The Public's Verdict, 47 Pub. Opinion Q.
202, 207 (1983); The Insanity Plea on Trial, Newsweek, May 24, 1982, at 56; Kiernan &
Pianin, supra note 41, at A12; Letters to HinckleyJudge Criticize Acquittal, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 12, 1982, at 37.
44. See Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558,
S. 1995, S. 2572, S. 2658 and S. 2669 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) (statement of Sen. Arlen
Specter); Hans & Vidmar, supra note 8, at 182.
45. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 222 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3404.
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988).
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from the ALl definition primarily in eliminating the clause that defines
insanity as the lack of substantial capacity to conform one's conduct to
the requirements of the law (the "volitional" test).47 The new defini-
tion retains the clause defining insanity as the lack of substantial capac-
ity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act (the "cognitive" test). By
eliminating one possible method for proving insanity, the Act consider-
ably narrowed the scope of the defense.
Second, the Act shifted the burden of establishing insanity to the
defendant, making insanity an affirmative defense. Under the Act, the
defendant must now establish insanity by "clear and convincing evi-
dence."'48 This represented a sharp departure from former practice, in
which the government had been required to prove the defendant sane
beyond a reasonable doubt. In shifting the burden of proof, Congress
made it more difficult for a defendant to present a successful insanity
defense.
Third, and most relevant to the issue of jury instructions, the Act
explicitly recognized a separate verdict of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity and established a mandatory civil commitment procedure for
every defendant found NGI.49 Disposition of defendants found NGI
thus no longer depended on the vagaries of state civil commitment pro-
ceedings. Instead, such defendants would automatically be committed
to a mental hospital, and would be eligible for release only after they
could demonstrate that they posed no substantial risk of bodily injury
or harm to another.50 The Act thus eliminated the possibility that a
defendant could be acquitted based on insanity yet elude incarceration
altogether.
Although the Act made these significant changes in the federal
treatment of the insanity defense, it did not, on its face, address the
issue of whether judges should give jurors an instruction as to the con-
sequences of the newly defined NGI verdict. A report from the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, however, suggests that Congress consid-
ered the issue, despite its failure to pass a specific provision:
47. The volitional test had been criticized for failing to reflect modem, more
deterministic understandings of the nature of volitional action. As one witness before
the Senate Judiciary Committee explained, "[m]odern psychiatry has tended to view
man as controlled by antecedent hereditary and environmental factors." The Insanity
Defense: Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 2669, S. 2678, S. 2745, and S. 2780
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (testimony of
David Robinson of George Washington University), quoted in S. Rep. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 226 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3408. Under this
view, all criminal activity is, to some extent, non-volitional. As a result, the volitional
test fails to offer a clear standard by which to judge whether responsibility should attach
to a given act.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d) (1988). Prior to the Act, a defendant needed only to show
that there was a reasonable doubt about his sanity. See supra note 24.
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 4243 (1988).
50. See id. § 4243(0.
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The Committee endorses the procedure used in the District of
Columbia whereby the jury, in a case in which the insanity de-
fense has been raised, may be instructed on the effect of a ver-
dict of not guilty by reason of insanity. If the defendant
requests that the instruction not be given, it is within the dis-
cretion of the court whether to give it or not.5 1
This passage figures heavily in the decisions, handed down since pas-
sage of the Act, dealing with the issue of jury instructions.
B. Jury Instructions Since Passage of the Act
Following the enactment of the 1984 legislative reform, several
federal circuit courts have considered whether juries should be in-
formed of the consequences of an NGI verdict.5 2 The opinions from
these cases set forth roughly three different approaches to the issues.
In United States v. Neavill,53 an Eighth Circuit panel departed from
the majority of circuit court decisions made prior to the Act, and held
that trial judges should instruct jurors as to the consequences of an NGI
verdict. 54 Although this decision was subsequently vacated upon re-
hearing en banc55 and then dismissed at the defendant's request, 56 the
reasoning behind the Eighth Circuit's decision remains persuasive.
The defendant, James Neavill, had been convicted at trial of threaten-
ing to take the life of the President.57 On appeal, Neavill argued that
the lower court had erred in refusing to instruct the jury about the con-
sequences of an NGI verdict.
Largely adopting the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit in Lyles, 58 the
court held that Neavill was entitled to the instruction. 59 Although the
51. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3422 (footnotes omitted).
52. See United States v. Blume, 967 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 363 (1991); United States v.
Neavill, 868 F.2d 1000, 1005 (8th Cir.), vacated upon grant of reh'g en banc, 877 F.2d
1394 (8th Cir.), and appeal dismissed at defendant's request, 886 F.2d 220 (8th Cir.
1989) (en banc).
53. 868 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1989).
54. See id. at 1005.
55. United States v. Neavill, 877 F.2d 1394, 1394 (8th Cir. 1989).
56. United States v. Neavill, 886 F.2d 220, 220 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
57. The federal statute involved was 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1988). Neavill had walked
into a Missouri police station and claimed that a person named James Beckman was God
and had hired him to assassinate the President. After being questioned by a Secret
Service agent, Neavill repeated his statement and threatened that, if released, he would
"'put a bullet in the President's head.' " Neavill, 868 F.2d at 1001.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 26-3 1.
59. As of 1991, several state courts have generally adopted this approach, holding
that the instruction should be given. These states include Alaska, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia. See Fleming, supra note 3, at
675-79.
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court acknowledged that in earlier decisions it had followed the com-
mon practice of refusing to instruct juries about the consequences of an
insanity defense,60 the court distinguished these decisions, holding
that passage of the Insanity Defense Reform Act required a different
result. The court explained that prior decisions were based, in part,
"on the absence of a federal commitment statute." 61 Prior to the Act,
an acquittal based upon a successful insanity defense resulted in the
release of the defendant. Courts were concerned that such information
might prejudice the jury against an insanity verdict, since the jury's con-
cern that the defendant would be released would improperly influence
its deliberations on the merits of the case. After passage of the Act, the
court maintained, these considerations were no longer valid, since the
jury would be told that defendants found NGI would be committed. 62
In support of giving the instruction, the court cited the concern
that, without such an instruction, jurors would be confused about the
consequences of an NGI verdict. Indeed, jurors might wrongly believe
that the defendant would be released. The Neavill court looked to the
legislative history of the Act:63 "[T]he legislative history of the new Act
shows that Congress agreed with the D.C. Circuit['s decision in Lyles]
that jurors are not sure what happens to defendants who successfully
plead not guilty by reason of insanity. .. ."64 To prevent confusion of
the jury and the risk that such confusion might prejudice the defend-
ant's trial, the court held that judges should instruct juries about the
consequences of an NGI verdict.
Two years later, and in direct contrast to the Neavill court's ap-
proach, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Frank65 adhered to the tradi-
tional proscription, holding that trial judges should not inform juries of
the consequences of an NGI verdict.6 6 The Ninth Circuit addressed an
appeal very similar to that in Neavill. The defendant, Terrance Frank,
was convicted of second degree murder, assault with intent to commit
murder, and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of vio-
lence.67 Frank appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the district court erred
in refusing to instruct the jury as to the consequences of an NGI
60. See Neavill, 868 F.2d at 1002, citing Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th
Cir. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968).
61. Neavill, 868 F.2d at 1004; see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
62. See Neavill, 868 F.2d at 1004.
63. See S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3422; supra text accompanying note 51.
64. Neavill, 868 F.2d at 1004.
65. 956 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 363 (1991).
66. See id. at 878-82.
67. The crime occurred on the Navajo Indian Reservation in Arizona and was thus
subject to federal law. Specifically, Frank was charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1153
(1988) (second degree murder); 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a), 1153 (1988) (assault with intent to
commit murder); and 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 1153 (1988) (use of a firearm in commission
of a crime of violence). See Frank, 956 F.2d at 873-74.
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verdict.68
The Ninth Circuit held that the trial judge had properly refused to
give the instruction. 69 In so doing, the appeals court relied on the
traditional bar against instructing juries about the consequences of
their verdicts. Citing numerous precedents, the court found that the
bar was necessary to preserve the essential function of the jury as finder
of fact.70 According to the court, giving the jury an instruction as to the
consequences of an NGI verdict would serve only to distract the jury
from its appointed function. 71 Such information was irrelevant to the
issue before the jury, claimed the court, and might improperly influ-
ence the jury when making its findings of fact.
Although the court mentioned the Insanity Defense Reform Act, it
concluded that the Act had no impact on the decision to refuse the
instruction since it contained no express provision requiring the in-
struction to be given.72 The court examined the same legislative his-
tory that the Neavill court had considered, but its treatment of that
legislative history stands in sharp contrast. Although the court con-
ceded that Congress seemed to have intended courts to provide such
an instruction, 73 it refused to give the legislative history any weight.
The court stated that legislative history was relevant only when a stat-
ute contained ambiguous language. Since the statute did not mention
jury instructions, there was no ambiguous language to interpret, and
the legislative history was therefore not binding.74 In essence, the
court found that passage of the Act had no effect on the general pro-
scription against informing juries of the consequences of an NGI ver-
dict and that the original policies behind the proscription were still
68. The instruction Frank requested read:
If you find Mr. Frank not guilty by reason of insanity, the law requires that he
be committed to a suitable facility until such time, if ever, that the Court finds
he may safely be released back into the community.
Frank, 956 F.2d at 878.
69. See id. As of 1991, a majority of state courts (29) had adopted this approach,
holding that the instruction should generally not be given. These states include
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. See Fleming, supra note 3, at 686-95.
70. See Frank, 956 F.2d at 879.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 881-82.
73. See supra text accompanying note 51.
74. See Frank, 956 F.2d at 881-82. The court adopted a "plain meaning" approach
to statutory interpretation: "In interpreting the reach of a statute, we must look to the
plain meaning of words used by Congress. If the statute is unambiguous our inquiry
must stop." Id. at 881. Finding the language of the statute unambiguous, the court
refused to give the legislative history any weight: "'[C]ourts have no authority to enforce
principles gleaned solely from legislative history that has no statutory reference point.'"
Id. at 882 (quoting IBEW Workers v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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relevant.7 5
Two additional circuits have agreed with the Frank result-the
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Barnett76 and the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Shannon.77 Both courts relied on pre-Act precedents that
barred trial courts from informing juries of the consequences of an in-
sanity verdict. Both considered the passage of the Act, but, as the
Ninth Circuit did in Frank, found that it did not warrant a different re-
sult absent some explicit statutory directive. 78
Between the Frank court's rejection and the Neavill court's en-
dorsement of the instruction lies a recent decision by the Second
Circuit. In United States v. Blume, 79 the defendant, David Bianchini, was
convicted of conspiracy to produce marijuana, possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute, and interstate travel in furtherance of illegal
activity. Bianchini appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge
erred in refusing to give the jury an instruction about the consequences
of an NGI verdict.80
The Second Circuit held, in a summary fashion, that the decision
whether to give the jury such an instruction should be left to the discre-
tion of the trialjudge.81 The court noted that the Insanity Defense Re-
form Act, on its face, does not require such an instruction. The court,
however, read the same legislative history considered in both Frank and
Neavill to permit such an instruction, but not to require it.82
75. The court considered, but explicitly rejected, the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958),
discussed supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. See Frank, 956 F.2d at 879-80.
Frank subsequently filed an appeal of the Ninth Circuit's decision, but the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. See Frank v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 363, 363 (1991). In an
attached opinion "respecting the denial" of certiorari, Justice Stevens stated that he
believed trial courts should give juries the instruction, unless the defendant explicitly
requests that it not be given. See id. (Stevens, J.). Justice Stevens' reasoning largely
echoed that of the Neavill court, finding that the Act had removed the need for the
traditional bar. Justice Stevens also emphasized that the denial of certiorari was not a
ruling on the merits of the case, since a square conflict between the circuits had not yet
arisen (the Neavill decision having been vacated), and since it was the Court's practice to
await such a conflict before ruling on new federal legislation. See id. (Stevens, J.).
76. 968 F.2d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1992).
77. 981 F.2d 759, 765 (5th Cir. 1993).
78. See Shannon, 981 F.2d at 763; Barnett, 968 F.2d at 1192.
79. 967 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1992).
80. The trial judge instead gave a typical instruction:
[Tihe punishment provided by law for the offenses charged in the indictment
or any resulting proceeding ... [including the] result of the plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity is a matter exclusively [within] the province of the judge
and should never be considered by the jury in arriving at an impartial verdict as
to the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Id. at 49.
81. At least one state court has also taken this view. See Montague v. State, 360
N.E.2d 181, 189 (Ind. 1977).
82. See Blume, 967 F.2d at 49.
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Illustrating the unsettled status of the law in this area, the panel
decision included two separate concurrences, one by Judge Newman,
the other by Judge Winter. Judge Newman largely adopted the ap-
proach set forth in Neavill, focusing on the danger ofjury verdicts influ-
enced by a mistaken belief that an NGI verdict would result in release
of the defendant: "It makes no sense now to expose the defendant to the
risk of an undeserved guilty verdict by keeping the jurors ignorant of
the fact that a successful insanity defense would result in his confine-
ment." 83 ForJudge Newman, then, an instruction served to eliminate
this risk of an undeserved guilty verdict.
In contrast, Judge Winter's concurrence offered a variation on the
approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in Frank. Although arguing that
judges should generally refrain from instructing juries about the conse-
quences of an NGI verdict, Judge Winter stated that he would allow
such an instruction when the judge perceived a risk that the jury might,
in a particular case, mistakenly assume that the defendant would avoid
incarceration.84
III. AN EVALUATION OF EXISTING APPROACHES AND A
PROPOSED SOLUTION
The absence of specific statutory attention to the issue of jury in-
structions for an insanity verdict-and the conflicting jurisprudence
that currently exists in the federal courts on the subject-exposes crim-
inal defendants who raise insanity defenses in federal trials to the possi-
bility of arbitrary results. Moreover, the various approaches developed
thus far fail adequately to protect criminal defendants against all of the
various risks of prejudice posed by information about the consequences
of an NGI verdict. Some approaches protect only against the risk of
compromise verdicts, while others protect only against the risk ofjuror
error. This Note proposes an alternative approach, one that both safe-
guards the interests of the defendant and preserves the proper role of
the jury: instructing juries as to the consequences of an NGI verdict,
while at the same time taking steps to minimize the prejudicial effect of
such an instruction.
A. A Framework for the Analysis
Prior to the enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform Act, the
majority of federal courts, in refusing to give juries the instruction,
were able to guard against both the risk that the information would
distract the jury from its proper function and the risk that the informa-
tion might prompt the jury to convict in order to keep the defendant
incarcerated. Since passage of the Act, however, the calculus has
changed. The general concern about distraction of the jury remains
83. Id. at 52 (Newman, J., concurring).
84. See id. at 54 (Winter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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valid. However, the specific concern about improper conviction by the
jury is no longer warranted, as the Act's mandatory commitment provi-
sion would remove the jury's apprehension that the defendant found
NGI might be released. But while the Act put to rest one concern, it
gave rise to another: namely, that jurors would not be aware of the new
mandatory commitment procedures and would thus mistakenly believe
that the defendant would still be released if found NGI. The decisions
handed down after the Act thus reflect a desire to balance a new set of
risks.
Essentially, two analytically different risks animate the decisions of
the courts since passage of the Act. The first is the risk of mistake. In
the absence of an instruction, jurors may incorrectly assume that an
NGI verdict results in the release of the defendant. This mistake would
not be unreasonable, given the variations in the laws among the states
and the relatively recent changes in federal law. Such an assumption
could influence jurors to convict, despite a belief that the defendant
was legally insane, in order to ensure that the defendant would be in-
carcerated. This risk of mistake arose only after enactment of the stat-
ute (since prior to the statute, this belief would have accurately
reflected the state of the law at that time) and is the concern that drives
the Eighth Circuit's decision in Neavill.8 5 The second risk is the origi-
nal risk of compromise. By providing an instruction, the judge may
distract the jury from its sole function as finder of fact and thereby en-
courage verdicts tainted by compromise. This concern animates the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Frank.8 6
These two risks exist in tension. A decision to instruct the jury
decreases the risk of mistake, but increases the risk of compromise.
Conversely, a decision not to instruct decreases the risk of compromise,
but increases the risk of mistake. The approaches taken by Frank and
Neavill each guard against one of these risks, at the expense of the
other.8 7 Blume attempts to reconcile the tension between these two
risks by leaving the decision to the discretion of the judge.8 8 A more
85. See U.S. v. Neavill, 868 F.2d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir.), vacated upon grant of reh'g
en banc, 877 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir.), and appeal dismissed at defendant's request, 886 F.2d
220 (8th Cir. 1989).
86. See U.S. v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 363
(1991).
87. In People v. Cole, 172 N.W.2d 354, 366 (Mich. 1969), the Michigan Supreme
Court neatly framed this tension, viewing its decision as a choice between:
1) [Ihe possible miscarriage ofjustice by imprisoning a defendant who should
be hospitalized, due to refusal to [give the instruction to] the jury; and 2) the
possible "invitation to the jury" to forget their oath to render a true verdict
according to the evidence by advising them of the consequences of a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity.
In the end, the court decided that the harm of the first outweighed the harm of the
second, and accordingly required the instruction. See id.
88. See Blume, 967 F.2d at 49.
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effective approach would guard against both of these risks, minimizing
both types of prejudice to the defendant.
B. An Evaluation of the Proposed Approaches
The cases discussed above have adopted three different ap-
proaches to the issue. An evaluation of these three approaches, using
the two-pronged framework set forth above, reveals that none of them
adequately insulates the defendant from both the risk of mistake and
the risk of compromise.
1. Instruction Should Not Be Given. - The Ninth Circuit's decision
in Frank adheres to the traditional bar against informing the jury of the
consequences of its verdicts. But in doing so, it largely ignores the
manner in which the Act has altered the policy rationales supporting
the application of the traditional bar to the insanity defense.8 9
The passage of the Act effectively eliminated the most persuasive
argument in support of applying the proscription to the insanity de-
fense-that informing the jury that the defendant might not be com-
mitted if deemed insane would influence a jury to convict despite
believing the defendant legally insane. The Insanity Defense Reform
Act explicitly provides for mandatory commitment of defendants found
NGI. As a result, an instruction to the jury will not have the effect of
improperly influencing it to convict, since the jury will no longer be
motivated by a concern that an NGI verdict would result in the defend-
ant's release.
Even after the elimination of this justification, the court is still left
with the general rationale that informing jurors of the consequences of
their verdicts distracts them from their appointed role as finder of fact.
It is upon this rationale that the Frank court hangs its decision. For the
Ninth Circuit in Frank, the distracting effect of such an instruction was
sufficient basis for the court to refuse to give the instruction. °
Although this rationale may be persuasive in cases dealing with
jury instructions in general, there are reasons to doubt the applicability
of this rationale to cases in which the insanity defense has been raised.
First, it is unclear to what extent a simple instruction, telling the jury
that the defendant would be committed if found NGI, would actually
distract the jury from its fact-finding role. Juries typically know what
happens when a defendant is found guilty or innocent. Telling jurors
what happens after an NGI verdict would be equivalent to informing
them that guilty defendants go to jail and innocent defendants go
89. The comments in this section apply equally to the recent decisions by the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Shannon, 981 F.2d 759, 765 (5th Cir. 1993), and the Eleventh
Circuit in United States v. Barnett, 968 F.2d 1189, 1192 (11 th Cir. 1992), since both of
these decisions largely adopt the Frank court's reasoning. See supra notes 76-78 and
accompanying text.
90. See Frank, 956 F.2d at 822.
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free.9 1 That is, giving the instruction would simply be giving the jury as
much knowledge about the consequences of verdicts as it already has in
cases in which an insanity defense has not been raised.
Second, the degree to which such an instruction would increase the
risk of compromise remains questionable. Concededly, in a close case,
such an instruction may provide an avenue for a compromise among
jurors with differing opinions. Clear instructions, however, forbidding
the jury from using the information to strike such a compromise may
adequately guard against the risk. Moreover, jurors are often given am-
ple opportunity to strike such compromises when a case involves sev-
eral lesser included crimes (for example, when a defendant is charged
with both murder and manslaughter). Why should we be more con-
cerned about compromise in the case of an NGI verdict?92
Third, the Frank court's approach assumes that jurors, in the ab-
sence of information, will not speculate as to the consequences of their
verdict.93 In fact, refusing to give the instruction may be more distract-
ing than giving the instruction. At least one study has shown that ju-
rors in cases in which insanity is raised as a defense are extremely
interested in the consequences of the defense. 94 In fact, the study
found that evaluating the possible consequences of the verdict was one
of the most important factors in the jury deliberations. 95 Given the im-
portance jurors place on this information, uncertainty about the conse-
91. At least one study suggests that most jurors correctly assume that defendants
found NGI will be committed. See Morris, supra note 1, at 1068. From this, it could be
argued that there is no need to distract the jury with information that it already
possesses. Some jurors, however, may still wrongly assume that defendants found NGI
are released. See id. Moreover, those who correctly assume that defendants found NGI
will be committed may still harbor some degree of uncertainty. Both of these situations
may improperly influence juror decisionmaking processes.
92. See Bart R. Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed of the Consequences of the
Insanity Verdict?, 1980J. Psychiatry & L. 167, 174-75.
Jurors are already instructed on an array of "lesser included offenses" in most
cases. The authors of the compromise-verdict argument have failed to explain
why simply adding one more tier should increase the risk of compromise. With
or without the instruction, the jurors have ample opportunity to find a middle
ground between the extreme alternatives.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
93. This assumption finds support in the traditional view that a jury carefully
follows instructions given to it by thejudge. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324
n.9 (1985); Government of V.I. v. Fredericks, 578 F.2d 927, 936 (3d Cir. 1978).
94. See Weihofen, supra note 2, at 247. Weihofen cites a study conducted by the
University of Chicago Law School:
Preliminary statistics . . . show that [the consequence of an NGI verdict] is
indeed one of the most important factors in the jury deliberations. "If we
acquit him on the ground of insanity," the jury wants to know, "will he be set at
liberty to repeat his act?" Not a single jury studied in the jury project refrained
from considering what would happen to the defendant as a precondition for
arriving at a decision concerning his guilt or innocence, sanity or insanity.
95. See id.
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quences of an NGI verdict is likely to cause the jury to speculate about
what the consequences might be.9 6 Such speculation would distract the
jury from its appointed task, thus engendering precisely the harm
sought to be avoided.
Still, the general concern about distracting the jury might be
enough to justify refusing the instruction, were it not for a counter-
vailing risk not considered by the court. Absent from the Frank court's
calculus is any consideration of the possibility of mistake, that is, the
possibility that jurors may mistakenly believe that the defendant will be
released if found NGI. When a jury mistakenly believes that a defend-
ant will be released if found NGI, it may be persuaded to find the de-
fendant guilty in order to ensure that the defendant remain
incarcerated.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Frank can thus be viewed as a deci-
sion guarding against the risk of compromise, while ignoring the risk of
speculation or mistake. In refusing to give the instruction, the court
leaves open the possibility that, in some cases, a defendant may be con-
victed by a jury based on a false understanding that the defendant
would be released if found NGI. 97
2. Instruction Should Be Given. - In direct contrast to the Frank
court's approach, the Neavill court adopted a general policy of giving
the instruction to the jury. This approach enjoys support among com-
mentators,98 and primarily guards against the risk of mistake. Propo-
nents of this argument assert that giving the instruction will help
prevent possible misunderstandings among jurors as to the conse-
quences of an NGI verdict. A close corollary to this proposition is the
belief that giving the instruction will not unduly prejudice the
96. Preliminary findings from the University of Chicago study indicated that, in the
absence of an instruction, juries did speculate and sometimes erred in their conclusions
to the detriment of the defendant.
During the deliberations, many jurors who were somewhat disposed toward a
verdict of insanity were brought over to a guilty verdict by the argument that if
declared insane the defendant would go "scot free." They were won over
because the court had not instructed them on what actually would happen on
such a verdict.
Id. Recent studies suggest, however, that these findings may no longer be valid. See,
e.g., Morris, supra note 1, at 1068 (study indicating that most jurors correctly assume
defendants acquitted based on insanity will be committed).
97. This approach is also directly at odds with legislative intent on this issue. See
supra text accompanying note 51. Although such intent admittedly has no binding force
absent an explicit, or at least ambiguous, statutory directive, such intent should at least
have some persuasive force. Moreover, the legislative intent may indicate that
Congress, with its greater fact-finding ability, found that jurors generally did not
understand the consequences of an NGI verdict. Thus, it could be argued, courts
should defer to this finding and give the instruction.
98. See, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 7-6.8 (1984) (recommending
that judges give the instruction); Rita Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity 96
(1967) (same); Weihofen, supra note 2, at 247 (same); Fletcher, supra note 3, at 221
(discussing the insanity instruction in the state law context).
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defendant. 99
Although the first proposition is undoubtedly correct, the second
proposition may be subject to question. Giving the instruction would
certainly eliminate the risk of jurors mistakenly believing that an NGI
verdict would result in the defendant's immediate release; but, on the
other hand, the judge may, in so doing, invite a compromise verdict.
That is, in a close case, in which the jury believes the defendant may be
guilty but is not sure beyond a reasonable doubt, the instruction may
influence the jury to find the defendant NGI rather than not guilty, se-
cure in the knowledge that the defendant will neither be imprisoned
nor released. 10 0 In concluding that giving the instruction will not un-
duly prejudice the defendant, the Neavill approach gives short shrift to
the original concern underlying the general proscription against giving
such an instruction: the risk of compromise.
Although this concern may only be relevant in a close case, it
should at least be balanced against the usefulness of the jury instruc-
tion. Although an instruction may eliminate the risk of juror mistake,
the precise magnitude of this risk remains uncertain. At least one study
has suggested that most jurors correctly assume, in the absence of an
instruction, that defendants found NGI are subsequently committed. 10 1
If these data are accurate, the risk of mistake may in fact be low, and an
instruction may only serve to distract the jury without providing any
offsetting benefits.
3. Instruction Should Be Left to the Judge. - In contrast to the cate-
gorical approaches taken in both Neavill and Frank, the Second Circuit
in Blume adopts a flexible approach: leave the jury instruction to the
judge's discretion. 10 2 Although the Blume court failed to offer any justi-
fication for its holding, beyond a brief reference to the legislative his-
tory, at least one commentator has set forth several persuasive
justifications for this approach.'0 3
This argument starts with the premise that in some cases it may be
appropriate to give an instruction, while in others it may not. 10 4 Thus,
any categorical rule requiring or forbidding an instruction will always
be inappropriate in a given number of cases. Allowing the trial judge
to determine when the instruction is appropriate provides the system
with the flexibility to adapt to the specific circumstances of a given case.
Furthermore, the argument goes, a significant amount of uncer-
99. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 98, at 96 ("On occasion it can do some good and it
can never do any harm.").
100. This assumes that jurors will view incarceration in a mental hospital as less
severe than incarceration in prison, an assumption that is certainly open to debate.
101. See Morris, supra note 1, at 1068; see also Simon, supra note 98, at 96 (study
generally confirming the results found by Morris). But see Schwartz, supra note 92, at
173-74 (criticizing the methodology used in Simon study).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
103. See Schwartz, supra note 92, at 176-78.
104. See id. at 176.
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tainty limits our ability to know what the jury is considering.10 5 The
two categorical approaches taken in Neavill and Frank rest on un-
founded generalized assumptions about jury behavior and the forces
that influence the jury's decisionmaking process. These assumptions
rely not on any firm empirical basis, but on the intuition of judges.
Although researchers have conducted studies on the effect of informing
juries of the consequences of insanity verdicts, the results have been
equivocal at best and directly contradictory at worst.' 05 Moreover,
these studies are hampered by methodological difficulties stemming
from the inability accurately to simulate true courtroom situations. 0 7
Recognizing this unavoidable uncertainty, the Blume approach leaves
the decision to the particularjudge, who can best determine from expe-
rience, intuition, and an assessment of the particular circumstances
whether an instruction would be appropriate in a given case.
For example, statements by a prosecutor suggesting that the de-
fendant would be released if found NGI would alert the trial judge to
the possibility of a biased verdict.' 08 Similarly, in an exceptionally
close case, questions from the jury may indicate to the trial judge that
the jury is deadlocked and searching for a compromise. A judge is
best situated, the argument goes, to make these evaluations and can
thus most accurately determine when an instruction would be
appropriate.' 0 9
This approach thus attempts to reconcile the tension between the
risk of mistake and the risk of compromise, leaving it to the judge to
determine when one of these risks may be greater. It is certainly cor-
rect in recognizing the limited degree to which the courts can, in any
categorical way, determine whatjuries are thinking. While acknowledg-
ing that we have only limited information about what goes on in jurors'
minds, this approach gives the decisionmaking authority to the person
who ostensibly has the best chance of accurately making this determina-
tion: the trial judge.
Giving discretion to the judge, however, is not without its draw-
105. See id. at 175.
106. Compare, e.g., Simon, supra note 98, at 92-93 (study indicating that
information about consequences of insanity acquittal has no effect on verdict) with
Weihofen, supra note 2, at 247 (study indicating that information about consequences of
insanity acquittal is a crucial factor in jury decisionmaking process).
107. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 1, at 1060-61 (criticizing methodology of Simon
study); Schwartz, supra note 92, at 173-74 (same).
108. See, e.g., Dipert v. State, 286 N.E.2d 405, 406 (Ind. 1972) (prosecutor in
murder case stated that defendant would go "scot free" if found not guilty by reason of
insanity).
Some state courts have held that, while generally inappropriate, an instruction
should categorically be given when the prosecution suggests to the jury an inaccurate
view of what will happen to the defendant after an NGI verdict. See, e.g., Dipert, 286
N.E.2d at 407; State v. Huber, 361 N.W.2d 236, 238 (N.D.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106
(1985); State v. Huiett, 246 S.E.2d 862, 864 (S.C. 1978).
109. See Schwartz, supra note 92, at 176-78.
[Vol. 93:12231244
INSANITY INSTRUCTION
backs. It still involves a tradeoff between the risk of mistake and the
risk of compromise. Its main contribution rests in placing the determi-
nation of which risk is greater on the party ostensibly best situated to
make that determination. There is no evidence, however, that the trial
judge will be able to make that determination with any degree of accu-
racy. In many ways, the decision making processes of the jury can be
just as opaque to the trial judge as they are to anyone else.
For example, what should the trial judge conclude if the jury asks
her directly about the consequences of an NGI verdict?' 10 On the one
hand, it may indicate that the jury has doubts about the defendant's
innocence, but does not have enough evidence to convict. The jury
may be looking for a compromise. On the other hand, the question
from the jury could indicate that the jury believes that the defendant is
legally insane, but fears that the defendant may be released. In this
case, refusing to give the instruction could improperly persuade the
jury to convict, despite a belief that the defendant is legally insane.
Although the trial judge can monitor the course of the trial and look for
such clues, the decision still retains a significant amount of uncertainty.
This discretionary approach relies on the judge to steer a course
between the risk of compromise and risk of mistake. Although one can
argue that the trial judge will be less likely to err than would any other
possible decision maker,"1 ' a better approach would seek to eliminate
the chance of error altogether by minimizing both risks at the same
time.
C. A Proposed Solution
Courts should instead instruct the jury of the consequences of an
NGI verdict, and at the same time take steps to address the traditional
concern that such an instruction may pose a risk of a compromise ver-
dict. This can be accomplished by coupling the instruction with an ex-
plicit admonition to the jury not to consider the information in
deciding the facts of the case.
Giving the instruction eliminates completely the risk of mistake.
110. Some state courts have held that a defendant is not entitled to an instruction
even if jurors ask what will happen in the event of an NGI verdict. See, e.g., Gray v.
State, 482 So. 2d 1318, 1320-21 (Ala. 1985); Atkinson v. State, 391 N.E.2d 1170,
1176-77 (Ind. 1979).
111. Some courts have suggested that the decisionmaking power be vested in either
the defendant (by allowing the defendant to choose whether or not the judge gives the
instruction), see Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 917-18 (Alaska 1973), or the jury (by
giving the instruction when the jury requests it), see Commonwealth v. Mutina, 323
N.E.2d 294, 302 n.12 (Mass. 1975). These options are less attractive than the Blume
result, in that they are less apt to result in accurate verdicts. Vesting the power solely in
the hands of the defendant may result in the defendant exercising the power only when
doing so would be to his advantage. Vesting the power in the jury may require that the
instruction be given when the jury is looking for a compromise verdict. See Schwartz,
supra note 92, at 175-76.
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Even when jurors generally know that an NGI verdict results in commit-
ment of the defendant, an explicit instruction may put to rest any lin-
gering doubts or concerns about the possibility of the defendant's
release.
Although giving the instruction may increase the risk of compro-
mise, procedural safeguards can minimize this danger. For example,
immediately following the NGI instruction, the judge can explain that
the purpose of the information is solely to put to rest any speculation
on the part of the jury, and admonish the jury not to consider the infor-
mation as a factor in determining the defendant's guilt. 112 The instruc-
tion could take a form similar to the following:
If you find [the defendant] not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, the law requires that [he/she] be committed to a suita-
ble facility until such time, if ever, that the Court finds [he/
she] may safely be released back into the community.
This information is given to you so that you will not spec-
ulate about what will happen to [the defendant] if found not
guilty by reason of insanity. You are not to consider it in de-
termining whether or not [the defendant] is guilty, not guilty,
or not guilty by reason of insanity.
The traditional instruction informing the jury that issues of punishment
are to be left to the court 113 would further reinforce this warning.
This proposed approach, like the Blume approach, recognizes the
inherent sociological uncertainty associated with generalized predic-
tions ofjury behavior. Studies ofjury behavior do not give us a clear
sense of the relative magnitude of the risks of mistake or compromise
and are hampered by methodological limitations.1 14 This approach
deals with this uncertainty, however, in a manner different from that of
the Blume court. Instead of relying on the discretion of the trial judge
to choose between these two risks, this approach deals with the uncer-
tainty by taking steps to minimize both risks simultaneously, recognizing
the different natures of these two risks.
Some will object that informing the jury of the consequences of an
NGI verdict, while at the same time instructing the jury to ignore this
information in reaching its verdict, sends contradictory signals to the
jury and asks it to do the impossible. Given the information, the argu-
ment goes, jurors will not be able to avoid using it for an improper
purpose. As Judge Jerome Frank commented, such a limiting instruc-
tion is like "the story, by Mark Twain, of the boy told to stand in the
corner and not think of a white elephant."'1 15
112. This is, to a large extent, the approach adopted by the Colorado Supreme
Court in People v. Thomson, 591 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
113. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
115. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks, 155 F.2d 631, 656 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank,
J., dissenting).
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These arguments fail to recognize the distinct natures of the risks
being guarded against. Juror mistake arises from the lack of a particu-
lar piece of information and is generally unconscious in nature. Simply
providing this discrete piece of information is the best way of eliminat-
ing this risk. Juror compromise, in contrast, arises from a more com-
plex set of circumstances and is generally a more conscious decision on
the part of the juror. When a jury is deadlocked, information about a
possible compromise may offer the jury an attractive middle option. Ju-
rors must still, however, make a conscious decision to select the com-
promise option in the face of the evidence provided. The best way to
prevent this from happening is to instruct the jury not to take this
route. Since jury compromise is a conscious choice, an explicit instruc-
tion can serve to guide the jury's actions.
The instructions thus do not contradict, but rather complement
one another in simultaneously reducing juror misperception and risk of
abuse. The value of the instruction in eliminating the risk of mistake is
in the simple provision of a fact. Once the jury is aware of the fact, the
risk of mistake is eliminated. Any previous misconceptions or lingering
concerns are put to rest. Subsequently instructing the jury not to use
this fact in its deliberations does nothing to weaken this effect. Such an
instruction will only reduce the risk that the jury will actively use this
information to come to a compromise verdict.
Jurors are often asked to use information given them for only a
particular purpose. For example, evidence that reflects badly on a de-
fendant's character is generally inadmissible, since it may unfairly prej-
udice the jury against the defendant. 1 6 Yet this same evidence is often
admissible if used for another purpose, for example, to prove mo-
tive. 117 Jurors are told to (and trusted to) keep such evidence analyti-
cally separate. Although some commentators have criticized the
effectiveness of jury instructions and the degree to which juries under-
stand and follow them, these criticisms focus primarily on the more
complex instructions, such as instructions as to burden or standard of
proof. 1 8 The instruction at issue is much clearer and more easily un-
derstood than these other calculations, and is more akin to instructions
to disregard certain types of testimony. Studies have shown that such
instructions are generally followed." 19
116. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a).
117. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
118. See Amiram Elwork et al., Making Jury Instructions Understandable 12-17
(1982); LaurenceJ. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability ofJurors to
Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 L. & Soc. Rev. 153, 153-97
(1982).
119. See, e.g., Reid Hastie et al., Inside the Jury 87 (1983) ("[A] dear finding
emerges that the judge's instructions were extremely effective in stopping discussion
that would ordinarily, without the instruction, have occurred during deliberation.").
Hastie's findings, however, are subject to the same criticisms as other studies of jury
behavior. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
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Unlike the categorical approaches in Neavill and Frank, this ap-
proach does not choose one risk over the other, but tries to account for
both. Moreover, this proposal offers an advantage over the approach in
Blume in that it does not rely on the judge to balance the risks on an ad
hoc basis. By addressing both risks, this approach eliminates the need
for the trial judge to undertake the difficult task of reading the jury's
collective mind.
CONCLUSION
The issue in the end turns on a question of how juries behave. Do
they function better with more information? Or is it better to provide
them with just enough information to perform their limited function
properly? Our understanding of the way in which juries function is still
very limited. Given such lack of information, the best approach seeks
to account for, and to control, the various factors we believe affect the
jury decisionmaking process with an eye toward ensuring that verdicts
be as accurate and fair as possible. Because of the significance of the
jury in American law, any proposal that simultaneously preserves the
jury's role as fact-finder and prevents tainted verdicts should merit con-
siderable attention.
Joseph P. Liu
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